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We examine the impact of heterogeneous investors with asymmetric 
bargaining positions on transaction prices in private commercial real 
estate markets. Using a dataset that contains nearly 100,000 commer-
cial real estate transactions during 1997-2009, we examine the extent 
to which common conditions of sale and buyer characteristics affect 
bargaining power and negotiated prices. We find that tax-motivated 
buyers seeking to complete a delayed Section 1031 exchange pay an 
average price premium of 12.5% when purchasing smaller properties. 
However, these price premiums for exchange motivated buyers are not 
observed among more expensive properties. We find strong evidence 
that out-of-state buyers pay significantly more (8 - 11% premium) for 
commercial properties than in-state buyers. Consistent with our ex-
pectations, we find that sellers of distressed properties negotiate sig-
nificantly lower transaction prices (13 - 15% discount) than sellers of 
non-distressed properties, all else equal. Finally, we find evidence that 
REITs pay price premiums between 14 - 16% for office and industrial 
and retail properties. Our results strongly support the notion that rela-
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1. Introduction
In asset markets characterized by perfect competition and investment value 
revelation, all transactions take place at the true market value of the asset, as de-
termined by the marginal buyer and seller. In such markets, there is no need for 
buyers and sellers to search for the “true” market value of an asset; it is continu-
ously revealed by the transaction prices of perfect substitutes. Moreover, the het-
erogeneous investment motivations of potential buyers and sellers, and their rela-
tive negotiation positions and abilities have no role in the price formation process; 
all market participants are price takers. In fact, in the real estate appraisal literature, 
homogeneous investor motivations are central to the concept of market value.1 
* We thank CoStar Group, Inc. and, especially Norm Miller, Jay Spivey and Iolaire McFadden, 
for providing the data used in this study. We also thank David Geltner and seminar partici-
pants at the University of Reading for valuable comments.
1 Market value is defined as the following: “The most probable price which a property should 
bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer 
and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably and assuming the price is not affected by 
undue stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date 
and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby: (1) buyer and seller 
are typically motivated: (2) both parties are well informed advised, and each acting in what 
he considers his own best interest: (3) a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open 
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Private real property markets, however, are far from perfect, often exhibiting 
significant segmentation, information asymmetries, and illiquidity. In such thin 
markets, the true market value of a property is not readily observable and bar-
gaining is thought to be an important part of the price formation process (e.g., 
Harding, Knight, and Sirmans, 2003). A growing literature examines the extent 
to which differences across buyers and sellers in information availability, search 
costs, motivations, and bargaining power are priced in the market for owner-oc-
cupied homes.2 However, the pricing of these imperfections in commercial real es-
tate markets has received relatively little attention in the literature.3 
The extent to which heterogeneous search costs and bargaining power are 
manifested in observed transaction prices is an empirical question. For example, 
although the reservation price of a buyer with high search costs may exceed the 
true market value of the property, he may not have to pay his reservation price to 
acquire the property if the real estate brokerage and research industries are able to 
mitigate information asymmetries and search costs across market participants. If 
not, however, impatient buyers may not be protected from overpaying for assets. 
Using a dataset that contains nearly 100,000 commercial real estate transac-
tions that occurred during the 1997-2009 time period, we conduct hedonic regres-
sion analysis to examine the extent to which three empirical proxies for high search 
costs affect bargaining power and negotiated prices: (1) buyers seeking to complete 
a delayed Section 1031 exchange; (2) distressed sales; and (3) acquisitions by out-
of-state buyers. We also examine whether real estate investment trusts (REITs) pay 
price premiums when acquiring properties, a result found in several prior studies. 
Our primary results can be summarized as follows. First, tax-motivated buy-
ers seeking to complete a delayed Section 1031 exchange pay average price pre-
miums that range from approximately seven percent to 20 percent when purchas-
ing properties with acquisition prices less than $3.77 million, which is the mean 
transaction price in our sample. This result is consistent with our expectations 
that the time constraints associated with the successful completion of a delayed 
exchange increase the search costs, and therefore the reservation prices, of taxpay-
ers seeking to complete a delayed exchange. Interestingly, these significant price 
premiums for exchange motivated buyers are not observed among our subsample 
market: (4) payment is made in terms of cash in U. S. dollars or in terms of financial arrange-
ments comparable thereto; and (5) the price represents the normal consideration for the prop-
erty sold unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions by anyone associated 
with the sale.” National Residential Real Estate Appraisal Institute, http://www.nraiappraisers.
com.
2 See, for example, Glower, Haurin and Hendershott (1998), Turnbull and Sirmans (1993), Gelt-
ner, Kluger and Miller(1988), Quan and Quigley(1991), Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2003), 
and Harding, Knight and Sirmans (2003). 
3 Exceptions include papers by Colwell and Munneke (2006), Holmes and Slade (2001), Shilling, 
Benjamin and Sirmans (1990), Forgey, Rutherford and VanBuskirk (1994), Hardin and Wolver-
ton (1996), Lambson, McQueen and Slade (2004), Ling and Petrova (2008), and Hardin and 
Wolverton (1999).
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of properties with transaction prices greater than $3.77 million. We find consistent 
evidence that out-of-state buyers pay significantly more for commercial properties 
than in-state buyers and this result hold even in our subsample of properties with 
transaction prices greater than $3.77 million. This result is consistent with higher 
search costs among out-of-state buyers. Consistent with our expectations, we find 
that sellers of distressed properties negotiate significantly lower transaction prices 
than sellers of non-distressed properties, all else equal. With the exception of our 
office and industrial subsample, this result is found in both subsamples. Finally, 
we find evidence that REITs pay price premiums for office and industrial and re-
tail properties ranging from approximately nine percent to 18 percent. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual framework 
for analyzing the effects of heterogeneous search costs and bargaining power on 
reservation prices. Section 3 discusses why reservation prices may vary from true 
market values, including the heterogeneous search costs and bargaining power. 
Section 4 describes our empirical model, while section 5 discusses the data and 
summary statistics. Our regression results are presented and discussed in section 
6. Section 7 summarizes the analysis and offers some concluding comments. 
2. Conceptual Framework
Consider two populations of potential investors for a given type of commer-
cial real estate asset; for example, institutional quality shopping centers in the 
Buckhead submarket of Atlanta. One population of investors currently owns such 
a property; the other population consists of investors seeking to acquire such 
properties. Assume this property submarket functions as a well-ordered, double-
auction market; that is, with an auctioneer calling out prices and potential buyers 
and sellers revealing their reservation prices through their bid and ask prices. In 
this hypothetical market characterized by perfect competition and investment val-
ue revelation, all transactions in a cross-section would take place at an equilibrium 
price of Pe, the true market value (MV) of such properties. Implicit in this equi-
librium is that the supply of substitute properties for sale at any point in time is 
infinitely elastic, which renders buyer demand irrelevant. All transactions occur at 
a price equal to the estimated present value of the asset’s expected net cash flows, 
as determined by the marginal buyer and seller. In such a market, marginal buy-
ers and sellers are engaging in zero net present value (NPV) investment activities. 
Nevertheless, at the equilibrium price of Pe intramarginal investors may be engag-
ing in positive or negative NPV acquisitions or dispositions. 
Commercial real estate markets, however, do not embody the characteristics of 
a perfect auction market. Rather, buyers and sellers search for each other, interact, 
and consummate transactions in illiquid, highly segmented, informationally inef-
ficient private markets. As a consequence, the true market value of a transacted 
property is not likely to be revealed in such a transaction. Moreover, we cannot 
observe the reservation prices placed on the transacted property by the buyer and 
seller. We simply know that the observed transaction price is equal to or less than 
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the buyer’s investment value and equal to or greater than the seller ’s investment 
value. Nevertheless, observed transaction prices do provide valuable information 
to market participants about the true market value of the transacted property. In 
fact, rational buyers and sellers use transaction prices to determine their reserva-
tion prices, defined by Geltner et al. (2007) as “the prices at which they will stop 
searching any further for a willing partner and will agree to trade.” 
Figure 1 depicts the reservation price distributions for the buyer and seller 
populations in our hypothetical property market at a given point in time. The 
normal distribution to the left consists of potential buyers and the distribution to 
the right represents the reservation prices of potential sellers. The horizontal axis 
measures reservation prices on a per square foot basis. The vertical axis depicts 
the number of investors in each investor population with a reservation price equal 
to the price indicated on the horizontal axis. Bmin and Bmax represent the minimum 
and maximum reservation prices of potential buyers; Smin and Smax represent the 
corresponding reservation prices for potential sellers.
In such a market, observable transaction prices will range from Smin to Bmax. 
If we observe a sufficient number of sale transactions in this property submarket, 
the frequency distribution of negotiated transaction prices would be represented 
by the area under the curve that is centered around Pe and bounded by Smin and 
Bmax. The more numerous and frequent the transactions, the more homogeneous 
the transacted properties, or the easier it is to observe the details of a transaction, 
the greater is the probability that the price discovery process engaged in by buy-
ers and sellers will produce a distribution of reservation prices, and an observed 
transaction prices distribution that is tightly centered around Pe. The implication 
of this statistical perspective of true market value is that the arithmetic average of 
observed transaction prices is a statistically unbiased estimate of true market val-
ue, as of a point in time. Moreover, it is easy to show that the precision of the MV 
estimate increases with the number of transactions included in the average.4
Although a buyer’s reservation price in the presence of high search costs may 
exceed the true market value of the property, she may not have to pay her res-
ervation price to acquire the property. A necessary condition for a sale to occur 
is that the buyer’s offer price exceeds the seller ’s reservation price. However, the 
buyer’s offer price must also equal or exceed the maximum bid price of other in-
vestors who are simultaneously bidding on the property. Thus, the supply of sub-
stitute properties for sale at any point in time, as well as information asymmetries 
about the income producing ability of the transacted property and its substitutes, 
may also impact unobserved reservation prices, and therefore observed transac-
tion prices in the submarket. 
In summary, heterogeneous search costs and negotiating strength represent 
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for deviations between observed transac-
4 More formally, we require the mean of the potential transaction price distribution to equal its 
median which, in turn, requires that the buyer and seller reservation price distributions be 
symmetrical. It is also assumed that each transaction is independent of the others. 
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tion prices and (unobserved) true market values. The empirical question examined 
in our study is the extent to which segmentation, information asymmetries, and 
the resulting lack of liquidity in private commercial real estate markets, allow sell-
ers (buyers) to abstract price premiums (discounts) from differentially motivated 
or less informed buyers (sellers).
3. Heterogeneous Motivations, Bargaining Power, and Reservation Prices
What causes reservation prices for a commercial property to vary from Pe? 
First, even given identical information about current and expected future market 
conditions, individual market participants will usually formulate varying expecta-
tions about future rental rates, resale values, operating expenses, and capital ex-
penditures for a given property. Moreover, market participants may differ signifi-
cantly in their cost of debt and equity capital, and therefore the discount rate they 
apply to future cash flows. 
A second source of potential variation in reservation prices for a particular 
property is the operational advantage an investor may gain, or maintain, by con-
trolling the productive capacity of the property. For example, ownership of an ad-
jacent site may provide an owner-developer with a unique opportunity to profit 
from certain types of development due to synergy and spillover effects.5 
Finally, reservation prices are also based on the cost to potential buyers of con-
tinuing to search for suitable alternative properties and the cost to sellers of con-
tinuing to search for buyers. Standard search models (e.g., Turnbull and Sirmans, 
1993) predict that owners and sellers will continue to search for better “deals” un-
5 See, for example, Geltner et al. (2007).
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til the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. Thus, buyers (sellers) with higher 
search costs search less and have higher (lower) reservation prices than compet-
ing investors with lower search costs, all else equal. For example, a potential buy-
er unfamiliar with the local real estate market may face higher search costs than 
do experts in the local market. As a result, the difficulty and cost of continuing to 
search can be significant and the reservation prices of such buyers will be higher, 
all else equal.6 In contrast, distressed sellers may have lower reservation prices be-
cause of the high costs they incur by continuing to search for suitable buyers. 
The data employed in this study (discussed in detail below) have several ad-
vantages. First, we are able to obtain a sample of nearly 100,000 commercial real 
estate transactions distributed across 13 years, ten major metropolitan markets, 
and over 100 submarkets. With the exception of Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans 
(2003), the limited empirical work in this area has been hampered by small, and 
possibly unrepresentative, samples. Second, the data contain several variables 
that, as we argue below, strongly indicate high search costs and reduced or en-
hanced bargaining power. We next discuss these heterogeneous investor motiva-
tions and their posited effect on reservations prices. 
Tax-Deferred Exchanges
Realized gains from the sale of real property must generally be recognized 
for federal income purposes in the year of sale.7 However, under Section 1031 of 
the internal revenue code (IRC), real estate owners who dispose of their invest-
ment property and reinvest the net proceeds in other “like kind” property are 
able to defer recognition of some or all of the capital gain realized on the sale 
of the relinquished property.8 When the replacement property is subsequently 
disposed of, the realized gain will be larger to the extent of the deferred gain on 
the original disposition. However, if the subsequent disposition of the replace-
ment property is also structured in the form of a Section 1031 exchange, the 
realized gain can again be deferred.9 Ling and Petrova (2008) estimate that the 
maximum present value of this capital gain deferral ranges from five to ten per-
cent of property value.
6 See, for example, Haurin (1988), Miceli (1989), Forgey, Rutherford and Springer (1996) and Ar-
nold (1999). 
7 Internal Revenue Code Section 1001(c).
8 Like kind means “similar in nature or character.” In fact, virtually any real estate is like-kind to 
any other real estate. However, real property is not like-kind to personal property. Therefore, 
for example, a warehouse cannot be exchanged for jewelry. In addition, foreign property can-
not be exchanged for U.S. property. 
9 Tax deferral turns into permanent tax savings upon the death of the taxpayer because the 
basis of the property is “stepped-up” to its current fair market value. Thus, the taxpayer ’s 
heirs can dispose of the property in a fully taxable sale and not have to pay taxes on gains de-
ferred through the prior use of one or more Section 1031 exchanges. 
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Most Section 1031 transactions are “delayed” rather than simultaneous ex-
changes. Within 45 days of the sale of the relinquished property, the taxpayer 
making use of a delayed exchange must formally identify the replacement prop-
erty.10 Moreover, the taxpayer must acquire the identified replacement property 
within 180 days of the date of the closing of the relinquished property. There are 
no exceptions to these time limits and failure to comply will convert the transac-
tion to a fully taxable sale.11 
Investors face significant compliance risk when seeking to complete a tax-de-
ferred exchange by identifying and purchasing a replacement property within the 
45- and 180-day time limits. We posit that the strict time requirements imposed by 
IRS regulations on the buyers of replacement properties lead to buyer impatience 
and therefore higher search costs and reservation prices, all else equal. Therefore, 
buyers seeking to complete a delayed exchange are typically at a bargaining dis-
advantage relative to less time constrained buyers. 
Distressed Sales
Harding, Knight, and Sirmans (2003) argue that sellers of vacant single-family 
homes are at a clear bargaining disadvantage relative to other sellers. In particu-
lar, vacant home sellers bear the full cost of carrying the property with no offset-
ting rental income. These high carrying costs increase sellers’ search costs, thereby, 
thereby increasing their impatience toward prolonging the search for a buyer. Us-
ing data from Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Modesto, California, Harding, Knight 
and Sirmans find evidence that this weakened bargaining position reduces the ne-
gotiated sale price of vacant homes. Anglin (1999) also provides related evidence 
that seller impatience reduces negotiated prices, all else equal. 
In our commercial data set, CoStar classifies some of the confirmed sale trans-
actions in our data set as “distressed.” This classification may include properties 
disposed in liquidation sales or as part of bankruptcy proceedings. This variable 
also captures transactions in which the borrower has defaulted on his mortgage 
note and is facing foreclosure. It is important to note that this variables does not 
capture the real estate owned (REO) by banks and other lenders as a result of the 
consummation of foreclosure proceedings. 
10 To allow for the possibility that the taxpayer may not be able to come to terms with the owner 
of the potential replacement property, the taxpayer may designate more than one replacement 
property. More specifically, the taxpayer can (1) identify up to three properties of any value 
or (2) identify more than three properties so long as their combined values do not exceed 200 
percent of the value of the relinquished property. 
11 Delayed exchanges are often referred to as “Starker” exchanges, which is a reference to the 
1979 U.S. Supreme Court case that established the legal basis for non-simultaneous, tax-de-
ferred exchanges: Starker vs. United States, 602 F. 2d 1341 (9th cir., 1979)
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Out-of-Market Buyers
Prior research suggests that buyers more familiar with high-cost markets may 
begin their search for commercial properly acquisitions in lower cost markets with 
an anchoring-induced bias.12 This bias may induce buyers from high-cost markets 
to outbid local market participants. Moreover, out-of-market bidders may face sig-
nificant information asymmetries, and therefore higher search costs, when com-
peting against local market participants. As discussed above, Turnbull and Sirmans 
(1993) argue that investors with higher search costs (out-of-market buyers) search 
less and have higher reservation prices than (local) market participants with lower 
search costs. The empirical question of primary interest in this study is whether 
commercial real estate markets are segmented enough, and market information 
flows impacted enough, to allow more informed local traders to extract price pre-
miums from less informed out-of-market buyers.
REIT Acquisitions
Using data from the 1980s and 1990s, two empirical studies have concluded 
that REITs did pay significant acquisition premiums.13 However, these studies 
employed very small datasets from three or fewer metropolitan areas. Thus, it is 
difficult to generalize the results, even for the limited time periods investigated. 
Moreover, in more recent years REITs have often been outbid for properties by 
private entities, as witnessed by the significant number of transactions during 
the early to mid-2000s in which private entities acquired publicly-traded REITs. 
For example, by 2005 the Blackstone Group had acquired more than $20 billion 
in hotel assets and proceeded to purchase Equity Office Properties, a publicly-
traded REIT, for more than $39 billion in 2007. These “going-private” transactions 
appear to have been fuelled by relatively low interest rates, a “wall” of available 
mortgage capital, and rising commercial real estate values, at least through 2007. 
Another motivating factor for the payment of price premiums by private buyers 
often mentioned by real estate professionals is the ability of private owners to 
employ significantly more financial leverage than REITs to the acquired proper-
ties, thereby creating value and increased returns for investors. The anecdotal ev-
idence suggests that the price premiums paid by private acquirers in recent years 
exceed the premiums offered by REITs to acquire assets. In short, a more compre-
hensive analysis of REIT acquisition premiums or discounts requires the use of a 
large, comprehensive sample of private commercial real estate transactions that 
includes a sufficient time series.
12 See, for example, Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004) and the references contained therein. 
13 See, for example, Hardin and Wolverton (1999) and Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004).
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4. Empirical Methodology
We use hedonic regression models to identify empirically the impact of atypi-
cal motivations and bargaining power on observed transaction prices. Griliches 
(1971), Rosen (1974), and Epple (1987) have developed the traditional hedonic 
framework for modeling the prices of heterogeneous assets, which views a prop-
erty as a bundle of utility-generating characteristics, such as size, age, amenities, 
and location. The shadow prices of these hedonic characteristics are, in theory, 
revealed through the sale of properties with differing characteristic bundles. Ac-
cording to the hedonic valuation model, the value of a property is the sum of the 
values of each component in the bundle. 
More specifically, following Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003), let i de-
note a commercial property defined by a bundle of characteristics, Ci. The vec-
tor of shadow prices corresponding to Ci is defined as s. The market value, Pe, of 
property i is simply a linear combination of Ci and s:
ln(Pi
e )= s 'Ci .  (1)
Note that there is no role for differential buyer and seller motivations, search 
costs, or bargaining power in equation (1). Rather, the model predicts that transac-
tions will occur at a price equal to the market value of the property, net of adjust-
ments for the physical and locational characteristics of the property. 
In practice, it is difficult for potential buyers and sellers to observe the relevant 
vector of characteristic prices because commercial real estate assets trade in thin, 
informationally inefficient markets. As a result, search costs increase and some 
market participants may gain a degree of market power which, in turn, creates 
incentives for bargaining.14 
Assume bargaining power does not influence the underlying shadow prices of 
the physical and locational characteristics. Rather, bargaining increases or decreas-
es the transaction price by a fixed percentage relative to Pe. Then, for property i 
we can write
ln(Pi
e )= s 'Ci +Bi ,  (2)
where Bi denotes the impact of bargaining on the observed transaction price for 
property i. Positive values of Bi may obtain, for example, when a weak buyer ne-
gotiates with a strong seller.
The complete specification of our semi-log hedonic apartment regression mod-
el is as follows:
14 Discussions of the impact of search costs on buyer behavior can be found in Haurin (1988), 
Miceli (1989), Forgey, Rutherford and Springer (1996) and Arnold (1999). 
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LNPRICE  is the natural logarithm of the sale price;
α0  is a constant term;
AGE  is age of the structure(s) in years;
AGE2 is equal to the square of AGE; 
SQFT  is the total square footage of improvements in thousands;
SQFT2 is equal to the square of SQFT;
LANDSQFT is the land square footage in thousands;
LANDSQFT is the square of LANDSQFT;
FLOORS  is number of floors in the structure(s);
BCLASS indicates the class of the building (A, C, or missing); BCLASS_B 
(building class B) is the omitted variable.
BMATER indicates the frame construction materials (metal, reinforced con-
crete, steel, wood, or missing); BMATER_MASONRY (indicating 
whether the frame construction material is masonry) is the omitted 
frame construction material variable.
COND indicates the condition of the building (excellent, average or fair); 
COND_G, indicating a good structure condition is the omitted 
building condition variable
EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if the transaction involves the 
acquisition of a replacement property by a taxpayer completing a 
delayed exchange; 
DISTRESS is a binary variable set equal to one if the transaction involves a 
distressed sale; 
BUYOUT is a binary variable set equal to one if the buyer resides out-of-
state;
BUYREIT is a binary variable set equal to one if the acquirer is a REIT; 
UNITS  is the number of apartment units;
YRn  is a binary variable indicating the year of the transaction; 1997 is 
suppressed; 
INTERi is one of the nine atypical motivations interactions found in the 
data15; 
15 These motivation interactions are EXCHANGE*PORTFOLIO, EXCHANGE*DISTRESS, 
EXCHANGE*BUYOUT, EXCHANGE*BUYREIT, PORTFOLIO*BUYOUT, PORTFOLIO*BUYREIT, 
DISTRESS*BUYOUT, DISTRESS*BUYREIT, and BUYOUT*BUYREIT. There are no cases of 
three of our motivations existing simultaneously in the data. 
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SMDUMs  are binary variables indicating in which of the CoStar defined sub-
markets the property is located; 
SPTDUMp  are binary variables indicating the sub-property type of the build-
ing; and 
εm is an error term.
The regression models used to test for the existence of bargaining price effects 
in our retail, office and industrial samples are identical to equation (3) except that 
UNITS is not employed as an explanatory variable. 
An advantage of using the log of sale price as the dependent variable is that 
less weight is given to extreme values than when using untransformed prices. 
With this semi-log functional form, unit sale price per unit change in a physical 
or locational characteristic is obtained by multiplying the characteristic’s estimated 
coefficient by the observed selling price.16 
We expect a negative relation between property age and sale price and a posi-
tive coefficient on age squared (AGE2). This expectation reflects the frequently ob-
served quadratic relation between price and age, with a positive “vintage” effect 
frequently observed for historical properties. The estimated coefficients on SQFT, 
LANDSQFT, FLOORS and UNITS are expected to be positive. We control for the 
effects of location by including submarket fixed effects. The submarkets in each 
metropolitan area are defined by CoStar based upon discussions with local bro-
kers. CoStar first identifies local submarkets and then aggregates submarkets into 
submarket clusters based on their perceived similarities. 
5. Data
At year end 2008, the estimated value of investible U.S. commercial real estate 
was approximately $6 trillion, slightly larger than the market for U.S. Treasury se-
curities and more than twice the size of the U.S. municipal bond market.17 CoStar 
Group, Inc. attempts to include and verify every for-sale listing of commercial real 
estate in the U.S., as well as principal-to-principal deals and other sales not includ-
ed in a listing service. To assure reliability of the data, CoStar requires its agents 
to physically inspect the site and photograph the property, call and interview the 
principals, confirm transaction details, and examine and consolidate documents 
and deeds. To keep our analysis manageable, we obtained transaction data for the 
following ten major metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, Chicago, Phoenix, San Di-
16 The choice of functional form is extremely important in hedonic regression and little theory ex-
ists to guide the choice. Weirick and Ingram (1990) argue that the linear form has serious defi-
ciencies from a market theory standpoint because the marginal contribution to value of vari-
ables such as square footage and lot size is not likely to be constant. The semi-log and log-linear 
models, in contrast, assume a nonlinear relation between sale price and the explanatory values. 
17 Ling and Archer (2010), page 435. 
16 M. Petrova, D. C. Ling
ego, Atlanta, Seattle, Washington, D.C., Dallas, Tucson, and Boston. Moreover, we 
focus on three major commercial property types: apartments, retail, and office and 
industrial with a sales price of at least $500,000. Hotels, mobile homes, and other 
special-use properties are not included in the analysis. Our initial 1997-2009 sam-
ple contains 169,126 sale transactions with confirmed sales prices. 
We next exclude 22,598 transactions associated with a CoStar delineated “spe-
cial condition;” for example, sales that were part of an auction, sales of apartments 
to be converted to condominiums, sale-leaseback transactions, or sales that involved 
damage from natural disasters, building contamination, or the threat of contamina-
tion. The removal of transactions associated with these special sale conditions yields 
a sample of 146,528 observations. Observations were also deleted if there were 
missing variables required for our hedonic regressions, including building age and 
square footage, land square footage, the state in which the buyers resides, number 
of floors, and the condition of the building. Apartment observations were also de-
leted if the record did not contain the number of units in the building(s). 
In addition to a separate attribute field indicating whether the sold property 
was involved in a tax-deferred exchange, the CoStar Comps Professional database 
contains descriptive information on the type of the exchange in detailed notes. In-
spection of these notes allows us to determine whether the exchange was a simul-
taneous exchange, a delayed exchange in which the seller was relinquishing the 
property to begin an exchange, or a delayed exchange in which the buyer was ac-
quiring the property to complete an exchange. As discussed above, many taxpay-
ers seeking to complete a delayed exchange by acquiring a replacement property 
within the allowed 180-day period are in a significantly impaired bargaining posi-
tion due to the high cost of continuing to search. Properties acquired by buyers 
seeking to complete a delayed exchange are the exchanges transactions of inter-
est in this study. We therefore exclude observations if they involved a direct ex-
change, a simultaneous exchange, or if the transaction involved the disposition of 
a relinquished property at the front end of a delayed exchange. These deletions 
further reduced our sample by 7,177 observations. This produced a final regres-
sion sample of 96,741 sale transactions. The steps taken to construct our regression 
sample are summarized in Table 1. 
Our regression dataset contains 35,252 apartment, 33,937 office and industrial, 
and 27,552 retail sale transactions. Table 2 provides information on the percent-
age of these transactions that involved one of our three empirical proxies for high 
search costs, as well as the percentage of transactions that involved a REIT buyer. 
For example, of the 35,252 apartment sales in our dataset, 3,235 (9.2 percent) in-
volved an exchange motivated buyer and 621 (1.8 percent) were categorized by 
CoStar as a distressed sale. In 4,668 (13.2 percent) of the apartment transactions, 
the buyer resided out-of-state; in 148 transactions the buyer could clearly be iden-
tified as a real estate investment trust (REIT). Overall, 8,672 apartment transac-
tions involved atypical search costs or a REIT buyer, which is nearly 25 percent of 
total apartment sales. 
Relative to the apartment sample, fewer office and industrial transactions (5.1 
percent) involved a tax-deferred exchange buyer. In contrast, a somewhat larger 
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percentage of office and industrial properties (16.1 percent) were purchased by 
out-of-state buyers. The prevalence of atypical search costs in our retail sample is 
broadly similar to the office/industrial sample. 
In addition to our ability to quantify the effects of high search costs and ne-
gotiating positions on transaction prices, the simultaneous existence of two atyp-
ical motivations in some transactions allows us to examine the interactive effect 
of multiple atypical motivations.18 Panel A of Table 3 contains information on the 
percentage of transactions in our sample that involve simultaneously two of our 
empirical proxies for high search costs. A delayed exchange by an out-of-state 
buyer is the most common combination, accounting for 0.86 percent of all transac-
tions in our sample. Out-of-state REIT buyers and acquisitions by out-of-state buy-
ers of distressed properties account for 0.35 percent and 0.19 percent of the overall 
sample, respectively.
Panel B of Table 3 provides information on the incidence of each proxy for 
high search costs, conditional on the existence of a second motivation. For exam-
ple, conditional on the sale being characterized by CoStar as “distressed,” there is 
a 3.72 percent probability that the transaction also involved an exchange-motivat-
ed buyer. Panel B of Table 3 clearly reveals a significant strength of our dataset: 
the ability to control for and analyze the effects of multiple atypical search costs/
motivations. For example, 61 percent of REIT acquisitions also involve an out-of-
state buyer. We control for these interactions in our regression analysis.
Summary statistics for the variables in our apartment regression dataset are 
presented in the first two columns of Table 4. The average apartment property in 
our sample sold for $3,426,205 (PRICE), is 43 years old, contains nearly 40 thou-
sand square feet of improvements (SQFT), is built on approximately 107thousand 
square feet of land (LANDSQFT), and has 2.34 floors (FLOORS) and nearly 45 units 
(UNITS). Five percent of the apartment transactions occurred in 1997 and 2008; 
6 percent in 1998. Eighty-two percent of the apartment properties in our sample 
were characterized by CoStar as being in average condition; the corresponding 
percentages for the office/industrial sample and the retail sample are 67 percent 
and 71 percent, respectively. The percentage of apartment transactions in our sam-
ple that occurred in 1997-2009 ranges from two percent (2009) to 14 percent (2004). 
Table 4 also reveals that nine percent of apartment transactions involve the 
purchase of a replacement property to finalize a delayed exchange (EXCHANGE); 
13 percent of the apartment properties in our sample were purchase by out-of-state 
buyers (BUYOUT); and two percent involved a distressed sale (DISTRESS). REITs 
were not actively involved in apartment transactions during our study period. 
Corresponding summary statistics for our office/industrial sample are provid-
ed in columns three and four of Table 4. With an average sale price of $5,119,900, 
office/industrial properties transact at prices significantly higher than the average 
selling price of apartment properties. The average office/industrial property in our 
sample is 30 years old, contains 46 thousand square feet of improvements, is built 
18 None of the 96,741 transactions in our sample included more than two atypical motivations. 
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on approximately 132 thousand square feet of land, and has 2.18 floors. The av-
erage retail property in our sample sold for $2,546,876, is 36 years old, contains 
17 thousand square feet of improvements, is built on approximately 153 thousand 
square feet of land, and has 1.35 floors. The distribution of both office/industrial 
sales and retail sales across the sample period is similar to the distribution of sales 
in the apartment sample. A smaller percentage of both office/industrial and retail 
sales (5 percent) involve the purchase of a replacement property to finalize a de-
layed exchange. However, the percentage of properties involved in a distressed 
sale is similar to the apartment sample. A larger percentage of retail buyers (17 
percent) reside out-of-state. 
6. Empirical Results
As buyers’ level of sophistication may vary significantly for small vs. large 
properties, we hypothesize that impact of buyers’ and sellers’ search costs may 
be different whether we are dealing with a small or a large transaction. We ex-
pect greater effects for smaller properties in all cases, but with purchases by RE-
ITs. The anecdotal evidence suggests that REITs tend to invest in larger and more 
expensive properties; therefore, we expect any price effect due to the higher 
search costs faced by REITs, due to the number of restrictions they face, to be 
more prominent in our subsample of large properties. Tables 5 and 6 present our 
base-case regression results from the estimation of equation (3) by property type. 
The results in Table 5 are for transaction prices less than $3.77 million; Table 6 con-
tains results for the sample of properties that sold for more than $3.77 million. For 
each property type, estimated coefficients are presented first, followed by the cor-
responding t-statistics. Table 5 reveals that the estimated coefficients on land and 
structural attributes are of the predicted sign and statistically significant in most 
of the regressions. For example, the estimated coefficient on AGE is negative and 
highly significant in all three property type models. However, the estimated coef-
ficient on aged squared (AGE2) is positive and significant, indicating that the neg-
ative effect of property age on price increases at a decreasing rate. Similarly, the 
estimated coefficient on SQFT is positive in all three property type regressions; 
however, the coefficient on SQFT2 is consistently negative and highly significant, 
indicating that the positive effect of square footage on price is nonlinear. Interest-
ingly, the estimated coefficient on LANDSQFT is not significantly different from 
zero in any of the three equations. All else equal, the number of floors in an apart-
ment building has a positive and significant effect on price, although this variable 
is not significant in the office/industrial or retail regressions. Finally, the number 
of units contained in an apartment complex has a positive and highly significant 
price effect, even after controlling for the square footage of the land and improve-
ments. Retail properties deemed to be in Excellent condition transacted at signifi-
cantly higher prices than properties listed to be in good condition (the omitted 
classification); all properties estimated by CoStar to be in average or fair condition 
sold for significantly less than properties in good condition. 
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The estimated coefficients on the year dummies, with 1997 as the omitted 
year, are consistently positive and significant, and their increasing magnitude un-
til 2008 and 2009 reveals substantial nominal price appreciation over the 13-year 
study period relative to 1997. Finally, although the estimated coefficients on the 
submarket cluster dummy variables are not reported in Table 5, many are statis-
tically significant and model fits are improved substantially by the inclusion of 
these submarket fixed effects. Even with controls for the location of the property 
within a CoStar delineated submarket, the estimated coefficients on latitude and 
longitude are also highly significant except in the retail regression. 
Turning to the variables of primary interest, we note that the estimated coef-
ficients on our three proxies for high search costs and impaired bargaining power 
all carry the expected sign and are highly significant. For example, tax motivated 
buyers completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange pay substantial price premi-
ums, all else equal, to obtain their desired tax deferral benefits. The positive and 
significant coefficients on EXCHANGE are consistent with a weakened negotiating 
position among tax motivated and time-constrained buyers. 
As discussed above, there exists limited evidence in the owner-occupied hous-
ing market that distressed sellers are forced to accept lower prices than non-dis-
tressed sellers (Harding, Knight, and Sirmans, 2003). The results reported in Ta-
ble 5 largely confirm this finding. More specifically, the estimated coefficient on 
DISTRESS is negative and highly significant in all three property type regressions. 
Consistent with the findings of Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004), the esti-
mated coefficient on BUYEROUT is positive and highly significant in the office/
industrial and retail models, suggesting that out-of-state buyers are at a competi-
tive disadvantage when competing for these properties with, presumably, better 
informed in-state buyers. In contrast, we find no evidence that out-of-state apart-
ment buyers pay higher prices, all else equal, when purchasing properties with 
transaction prices less than $3.77 million. 
Finally, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that REITs pay a premium when 
purchasing office and industrial properties. However, the estimated coefficient on 
BUYERREIT is not significant in the apartment and retail property regressions.
Table 6 contains the results from estimating equation (3) for properties with 
transaction prices greater than $3.77 million. The estimated coefficients on the 
structural characteristics are consistent with the corresponding results presented 
in Table 5. The coefficients on the year dummies suggest that larger properties did 
not experience as much price appreciation as smaller properties over the 2000-
2007 period. Moreover, the estimated coefficients on latitude and longitude are no 
longer significant. 
Among smaller properties, the estimated coefficient on EXCHANGE was posi-
tive and highly significant in all three property type equations. However, this re-
sult is not obtained with our sample of larger properties. That is, significant price 
premiums are confined to the tax motivated purchasers of properties with sale 
prices less than $3.77 million. This result may reflect a better understanding of the 
tax benefits associated with delayed exchanges among the purchasers of more ex-
pensive properties. 
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Similar to the results reported in Table 5, the estimated coefficient on BUYER-
OUT is positive and highly significant in the office/industrial and retail models, 
suggesting that out-of-state buyers are at a competitive disadvantage when com-
peting for these properties with, presumably, better informed in-state buyers. 
Moreover, in contrast to the results for smaller properties, we find evidence that 
out-of-state apartment buyers also pay higher prices, all else equal, when purchas-
ing properties with transaction prices greater than $3.77 million. The estimated co-
efficient on DISTRESS is negative and significant (at the 5 percent level) in the 
apartment and retail property regressions; this coefficient is not significant in the 
office and industrial regression. Overall, the results suggest that sellers of more ex-
pensive distressed properties are able to negotiate higher prices than sellers of less 
expensive distressed properties. Finally, we find evidence that REIT buyers pay 
more, on average, when acquiring office and industrial properties, as well as retail 
properties, with purchase prices greater than $3.77 million. 
To control for the possible effects of multiple motivations on transaction prices, 
we also include interaction variables equal to the product of all combinations of 
our four atypical motivations that appear in the data. The models including esti-
mated coefficients on the multiple motivations variable interactions are reported 
in Tables 7 and 8, for our subsample of properties with sale price less than $3.77 
million and transactions at prices equal to or exceeding $3.77 million, respective-
ly. Although several of these interactions are significant, generally their inclusion 
does not affect the magnitude or significance of the coefficients on EXCHANGE, 
BUYEROUT, DISTRESS, or BUYERREIT. 
The regression results presented in Tables 5-8 strongly suggest that different 
search costs and bargaining strength affect negotiated transaction prices in com-
mercial real estate markets. In this section we examine whether the extent to 
which the statistically significant price premiums and discounts reported above 
are economically significant. 
To quantify the economic significance of our empirical findings, we transform 
the estimated regression coefficients on our five atypical motivation coefficients 
into percentage (i.e., price) effects. More specifically, following Halvorsen and 
Palmquist (1980), we calculate percentage price changes for the estimated coeffi-
cients on EXCHANGE, DISTRESS, BUYOUT, and BUYREIT in each of the prop-
erty type models reported in Tables 5 and 6 using the following formula:
Percentage Price Effect = 100*g = 100*{exp(x) – 1}. 
g is the estimated effect on sale price of a condition and x is the type of atypical 
motivation. These marginal price effects by property type are reported in Table 9. 
Panel A presents the marginal price effects in transactions with prices less than 
3.77 Million. For example, in our apartment sample in panel A, the estimated price 
effect of EXCHANGE is 6.8 percent. The corresponding marginal price effects of 
EXCHANGE in our office and industrial, and retail sub-samples are 11.3 and 19.5 
percent, respectively. Out-of-state buyers are associated with price premiums in 
office and industrial and retail transactions that range from 10 – 12.8%. Distressed 
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sales are associated with significant price discounts across property types, with an 
average magnitude of 13 percent. Finally, we observe a 16.7% price premium asso-
ciated with REIT purchases in the office & industrial sub-sample.
Panel B of table 9 presents the percentage effects of heterogeneous search 
costs and bargaining power in large transactions (sale price equal to or exceed-
ing $3.77 million). We note that apartment exchanges are associated with a small 
price discount (3.2%). Out-of-state buyers continue to pay premiums, but their 
magnitude is reduced compared to the premiums observed in smaller transac-
tions. Distress sales are associated with a price discount of 10.7 and 18.8% percent 
in the apartment and retail sub-samples, respectively. Finally, REIT buyers pay on 
average 9 and 18 percent premiums when acquiring office & industrial, and re-
tail properties, respectively. The observed price effects are economically significant 
and consistent with our predictions.
7. Summary and Conclusion
Heterogeneous cash flow expectations, capital costs, operational efficiencies, 
investment motivations, and search costs can create significant variation in buyer 
and seller reservation prices for a particular property. However, in asset markets 
characterized by perfect competition and investment value revelation, these het-
erogeneities have no role in the price formation process; all market participants 
are price takers. 
Private real property markets, however, often exhibit significant segmenta-
tion, information asymmetries, and illiquidity. In such thin markets, the true mar-
ket value of a property is not readily observable and search costs and bargaining 
power are thought to be an important part of the price formation process. How-
ever, the pricing of these imperfections in commercial real estate markets has re-
ceived relatively little attention in the literature. 
The extent to which heterogeneous motivations and bargaining power are 
manifested in observed transaction prices is an empirical question. If search costs 
and information asymmetries cannot be mitigated by the brokerage and research 
industries, impatient buyers may not be protected from overpaying for assets 
and impatient sellers may obtain lower transaction prices than sellers with lower 
search costs. Moreover, the extent to which differences in information availability 
and search costs create transaction price differentials in private real estate markets 
is relevant to the broader literature on information asymmetries and search costs. 
Using a dataset that contains nearly 100,000 commercial real estate transactions 
that occurred during the 1997-2009 time period, we examine the extent to which 
three empirical proxies for high search costs affect negotiated prices: (1) buyers 
seeking to complete a delayed Section 1031 exchange; (2) distressed sales; and (3) 
acquisitions by out-of-state buyers. We also examine whether real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) pay price premiums when acquiring properties, a result found in sev-
eral prior studies. Our dataset facilitates a comprehensive empirical investigation of 
search costs and bargaining power not possible with previous datasets. 
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Our primary results can be summarized as follows. First, tax-motivated buy-
ers seeking to complete a delayed Section 1031 exchange pay average price pre-
miums that range from approximately seven percent to 20 percent when pur-
chasing properties with acquisition prices less than $3.77 million, which is the 
mean transaction price in our sample. This result is consistent with our expec-
tations that the time constraints associated with the successful completion of a 
delayed exchange increase the search costs, and therefore the reservation prices, 
of taxpayers seeking to complete a delayed exchange. Interestingly, these signif-
icant price premiums for exchange motivated buyers are not observed among 
our subsample of properties with transaction prices greater than $3.77 million. 
We find consistent evidence that out-of-state buyers pay significantly more for 
commercial properties than in-state buyers and this result hold even in our sub-
sample of properties with transaction prices greater than $3.77 million. This re-
sult is consistent with higher search costs among out-of-state buyers. Consistent 
with our expectations, we find that sellers of distressed properties negotiate sig-
nificantly lower transaction prices than sellers of non-distressed properties, all 
else equal. With the exception of our office and industrial subsample, this result 
is found in both subsamples. Finally, we find evidence that REITs pay price pre-
miums for office and industrial and retail properties ranging from approximately 
nine percent to 18 percent. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection.
Initial Sample 174,491
Less Sale Conditions* 24,093
150,398
Less Observations with Missing Data
Missing Age 11,771
Missing Building SF 865
Missing Land SF 3,841
Missing Buyer State Information 4,622
Missing Number of Floors 1,990
Missing Building Condition 9,339
Missing Assessed Value 15,024
Missing Number of Units (only for multi-family) 193
102,753
Less 1031 Exchange Downleg 6,965
Final Sample 95,788
Property level transaction data with sale prices exceeding $500,000 were obtained from the 
CoStar Comps Professional database for the following ten metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Phoenix, San Diego, Atlanta, Seattle, Washington, D.C., Dallas, Boston and Tucson. After 
the deletion of observations that involved special use properties, flex space and observations not 
confirmed by CoStar, our initial 1997-2010 sample contains 174,491 sale transactions. We next 
exclude 22,598 transactions associated with a CoStar delineated “special condition;” such as sales 
that were part of an auction, sales of apartments to be converted to condominiums, build-to-suit 
properties, buildings in shell conditions, properties with business value included, sale-leaseback 
transactions, portfolio sales or sales that involved damage from natural disasters, building 
contamination, or the threat of contamination. The removal of transactions associated with 
special conditions yields a sample of 150,398 observations. Observations were also deleted if they 
were missing variables required for our hedonic regressions, including assessed value, building 
age and square footage, land square footage, number of floors, building condition and buyer’s 
state of residence. Apartment observations were also deleted if the record did not contain the 
number of units in the building or buildings. Observations were excluded if they involved a type 
of exchange other than the acquisition of a property by a buyer seeking to complete a delayed 
tax-deferred exchange, such as a simultaneous or reverse exchange, or transactions involving 
the disposition of a relinquished property at the front end of a delayed exchange. These 
deletions reduced our sample by 6,965 observations. This produced a final sample of 96,741 sale 
transactions. The observation breakdown by property type is apartment, 32,711; office, 15,911; 
industrial, 19,430; and retail, 27,736. 
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Out-of-state Buyer 3,824 11.7% 2,527 15.9% 2,558 13.2% 4,285 15.4% 13,194 13.8%
1031 Exchange 3,046 9.3% 951 6.0% 776 4.0% 1,418 5.1% 6,191 6.5%
Distress Sale 350 1.1% 180 1.1% 252 1.3% 413 1.5% 1,195 1.2%
Buyer REIT 114 0.4% 137 0.9% 183 0.9% 129 0.5% 563 0.6%
All Motivations 3,510 10.7% 1,268 8.0% 1,211 6.2% 1,960 7.1% 7,949 8.3%
See the notes to Table 1 for a detailed description of our sample selection procedure. The CoStar 
Comps Professional contains detailed information on sale conditions, which can be used as proxies 
for buyers’ and sellers’ heterogeneous search costs. In particular, we are able to determine whether 
the buyer was completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange, whether the seller was under distress, 
whether the buyer resides in a state different from the location of the property, and whether the 
acquiring entity is a real estate investment trust (REIT). Other tax-deferred exchange types and 
motives are excluded from the sample and analysis. Our final regression sample contains 95,788 
sale transactions located in ten major metropolitan areas. The observation breakdown by property 
type is apartment, 32,711; office, 15,911; industrial, 19,430; and retail, 27,736.
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Table 3. Percentage of Transactions Sample Involving Two Proxies for Search Costs.






















EXCHANGE&BUYEROUT 857 0.89% 305 0.93% 153 0.96% 94 0.48% 305 1.10%
DISTRESS&BUYEROUT 165 0.17% 30 0.09% 20 0.13% 42 0.22% 73 0.26%
BUYREIT&BUYEROUT 350 0.37% 71 0.22% 89 0.56% 91 0.47% 99 0.36%
EXCHANGE&DISTRESS 49 0.05% 21 0.06% 10 0.06% 12 0.06% 6 0.02%
EXCHANGE&BUYREIT 4 0.00% 2 0.01% 1 0.01% 0 0.00% 1 0.00%
DISTRESS&BUYREIT 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0 1 0.00%
Panel B. Percent of incidence of motivation with other motivation
 BUYEROUT EXCHANGE DISTRESS BUYREIT
BUYEROUT 100.00% 6.50% 1.25% 2.65%
EXCHANGE 13.84% 100.00% 0.79% 0.06%
DISTRESS 13.81% 4.10% 100.00% 0.08%
BUYREIT 62.17% 0.71% 0.18% 100.00%
EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction represents the purchase of a 
replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange, DISTRESS is 
binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is 
a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a 
binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified as a REIT. 
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Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
PRICE 3,574,815 9,224,279 8,449,978 28,400,000 2,534,872 3,651,869 2,569,563 5,604,696
LNPRICE 14.27 1.01 14.68 1.32 14.30 0.84 14.20 0.87
LNASSESSED 13.51 1.27 14.06 1.49 13.55 1.12 13.32 1.19
AGE 43.56 25.14 33.82 29.21 29.41 21.14 36.14 30.42
SQFT 39.64 86.12 46.94 113.01 47.46 79.53 17.05 37.22
LANDSQFT 115.39 3,999.31 88.81 1,408.99 158.61 663.44 123.10 6,015.23
FLOORS 2.34 1.29 3.30 4.86 1.15 0.55 1.30 0.75
COND_E 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.16
COND_G 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35
COND_A 0.88 0.33 0.70 0.46 0.82 0.38 0.81 0.39
COND_F 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15
DUALBROKER 0.25 0.43 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.33
RENOVATED 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
LONGITUDE -109.650 15.13 -100.02 18.54 -101.83 17.17 -99.977 17.83
LATITUDE 36.316 4.56 37.35 4.73 37.20 4.61 37.350 4.77
Binary Variables        
BUYEROUT 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36
EXCHANGE 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22
DISTRESS 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12
BUYREIT 0.004 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.005 0.07
YR1997 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
YR1998 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22
YR1999 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
YR2000 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
YR2001 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
YR2002 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27
YR2003 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
YR2004 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33
YR2005 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
YR2006 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33
YR2007 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29
YR2008 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
(Continued)











Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
YR2009 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
YR2010 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
Apartment Specific Variables     
UNITS 45.81 93.22       
PRICE is the nominal sale price; LNPRICE is the natural log of the sale price; LNASSESSED is 
the natural log of the property’s assessed value; AGE is age of the property in years; SQFT is 
total square footage of improvements in thousand square feet; LANDSQFT is land square 
footage in thousand square feet; FLOORS is number of floors in the building; COND_E, 
COND_G, COND_A, COND_F denote excellent, good, adequate and fair condition of the 
structure, respectively. DUALBROKER is an indicator variable, equal to one if the seller and the 
buyer broker were the same firm, and zero otherwise; RENOVATED is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the property has been renovated within the last 4 years prior to sale. LONGITUDE is 
the longitude coordinate of the property; LATITUDE is the latitude coordinate of the property. 
EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction represents the purchase of a 
replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange; DISTRESS is 
binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is 
a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a 
binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified as a REIT. YRn are indicator variables 
for each year; UNITS is the number of apartment units.
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Table 5. Hedonic Regression Model where the Dependent Variable is the Natural Log of 
Apartment Sales Price.
 
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
CONST 5.349 0.83 10.537 *** 6.30 15.824 * 1.82 8.894 *** 41.56
LNASSESSED 0.459 *** 44.93 0.547 *** 40.5 0.362 *** 24.75 0.403 *** 42.82
AGE -0.001 *** -3.10 -0.003 *** -6.94 -0.006 *** -9.44 -0.006 *** -16.32
AGE2 0.000 -0.25 0.000 *** 4.87 0.000 *** 4.59 0.000 *** 10.22
SQFT 0.006 *** 16.89 0.005 *** 11.44 0.007 *** 14.34 0.011 *** 20.18
SQFT2 0.000 *** -6.66 0.000 *** -3.90 0.000 *** -5.40 0.000 *** -6.87
LANDSQFT 0.000 * -1.81 0.000 3.65 0.000 1.57 0.000 1.55
LANDSQFT2 0.000 * 1.83 0.000 -3.63 0.000 * -1.73 0.000 -1.52
FLOORS 0.042 *** 8.56 -0.008 *** -2.46 0.022 ** 2.03 -0.003 -0.34
COND_E 0.212 *** 7.12 0.240 ** 9.83 0.191 *** 7.94 0.328 *** 13.97
COND_G 0.100 *** 12.93 0.103 *** 9.34 0.038 *** 3.60 0.125 *** 13.54
COND_F -0.054 *** -2.90 0.045 0.93 0.007 0.29 -0.055 *** -2.85
DUALBROKER 0.071 *** 14.86 0.052 *** 5.09 0.021 ** 2.51 0.060 *** 7.14
RENOVATED -0.027 -0.27 0.148 2.01 0.159 *** 2.73 0.138 ** 2.29
BUYOUT 0.038 *** 3.78 0.235 *** 17.26 0.171 *** 14.85 0.170 *** 17.58
EXCHANGE 0.039 *** 5.91 0.132 *** 9.24 0.093 *** 6.93 0.164 *** 12.31
DISTRESS -0.231 *** -11.91 -0.192 *** -5.35 -0.164 *** -5.69 -0.245 *** -9.65
BUYREIT 0.132 *** 2.76 0.224 *** 4.09 0.139 *** 4.11 0.183 *** 3.97
LONGITUDE 0.109 ** 1.97 -0.041 ** -3.36 0.158 ** 2.02 0.035 1.39
LATITUDE 0.388 *** 5.16 -0.214 *** -2.83 0.246 *** 2.71 0.081 1.29
YR1998 -0.007 -0.17 -0.069 -1.00 0.045 0.83 0.065 1.10
YR1999 0.055 1.42 -0.021 -0.31 0.097 * 1.80 0.107 * 1.81
YR2000 0.090 ** 2.30 0.009 ** 0.13 0.154 *** 2.84 0.127 ** 2.16
YR2001 0.121 *** 3.10 -0.015 ** -0.22 0.164 *** 3.05 0.149 ** 2.53
YR2002 0.184 *** 4.69 -0.021 ** -0.32 0.171 *** 3.18 0.201 *** 3.42
YR2003 0.272 *** 6.93 -0.001 *** -0.01 0.206 *** 3.83 0.240 *** 4.08
YR2004 0.375 *** 9.50 0.127 *** 1.88 0.297 *** 5.52 0.330 *** 5.63
YR2005 0.483 *** 12.27 0.214 *** 3.15 0.436 *** 8.07 0.482 *** 8.21
YR2006 0.499 *** 12.50 0.228 *** 3.34 0.481 *** 8.87 0.508 *** 8.64
YR2007 0.494 *** 12.22 0.192 *** 2.79 0.519 *** 9.51 0.532 *** 8.99
YR2008 0.424 *** 10.17 0.176 *** 2.52 0.484 *** 8.70 0.502 *** 8.40
YR2009 0.278 *** 6.40 -0.037 *** -0.51 0.290 *** 5.03 0.316 *** 5.17
YR2010 0.217 *** 4.90 0.030 *** 0.39 0.266 *** 4.62 0.270 *** 4.27
UNITS 0.001 *** 5.63
Submarket Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-square
YES YES YES YES
0.87 0.86 0.75 0.73
Apartment Office Industrial Retail
32711 15911 19430 27736
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of the sale price. LNASSESSED is the natural log of the 
property’s assessed value; AGE is age of the property in years; AGE2 is age squared; SQFT 
is total square footage of improvements in thousand square feet; SQFT2 is SQFT squared; 
LANDSQFT is land square footage in thousand square feet; LANDSQFT2 is LANDSQFT 
squared; FLOORS is number of floors in the building; COND_E, COND_A, COND_F denote 
excellent, average and fair condition of the structure, respectively. COND_G, indicating a good 
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structure condition is the omitted building condition variable. DUALBROKER is an indicator 
variable, equal to one if the seller and the buyer broker were the same firm, and zero otherwise; 
RENOVATED is a dummy variable equal to one if the property has been renovated within 
the last 4 years prior to sale. EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction 
represents the purchase of a replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-
deferred exchange; DISTRESS is binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by 
CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-
of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified 
as a REIT. LONGITUDE is the longitude coordinate of the property; LATITUDE is the latitude 
coordinate of the property. YRn are indicator variables for each year; UNITS is the number of 
apartment units; CONST is the constant.
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Table 6. Hedonic Regression Model where the Dependent Variable is the Natural Log of 
Apartment Sales Price Including Interaction of Search Cost Proxies.
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
CONST 5.291 0.82 10.563 *** 6.35 15.789 * 1.81 8.894 *** 41.55
LNASSESSED 0.459 *** 44.96 0.547 *** 40.5 0.362 *** 24.75 0.403 *** 42.86
AGE -0.001 *** -3.09 -0.003 *** -6.96 -0.006 *** -9.46 -0.006 *** -16.33
AGE2 0.000 -0.26 0.000 *** 4.89 0.000 *** 4.60 0.000 *** 10.22
SQFT 0.006 *** 16.90 0.005 *** 11.44 0.007 *** 14.34 0.011 *** 20.19
SQFT2 0.000 *** -6.66 0.000 *** -3.9 0.000 *** -5.40 0.000 *** -6.87
LANDSQFT 0.000 * -1.82 0.000 *** 3.65 0.000 1.57 0.000 1.55
LANDSQFT2 0.000 * 1.84 0.000 *** -3.63 0.000 * -1.73 0.000 -1.52
FLOORS 0.042 *** 8.56 -0.008 ** -2.46 0.021 ** 2.01 -0.003 -0.34
COND_E 0.212 *** 7.11 0.239 *** 9.78 0.191 *** 7.94 0.328 *** 13.95
COND_G 0.100 *** 12.91 0.103 *** 9.33 0.037 *** 3.59 0.125 *** 13.55
COND_F -0.054 *** -2.91 0.045 0.93 0.007 0.28 -0.055 *** -2.85
DUALBROKER 0.071 *** 14.86 0.052 *** 5.06 0.021 ** 2.50 0.060 *** 7.13
RENOVATED -0.027 -0.28 0.149 ** 2.02 0.161 *** 2.75 0.138 ** 2.29
BUYOUT 0.040 *** 3.83 0.242 *** 17.08 0.169 *** 14.11 0.169 *** 16.86
EXCHANGE 0.041 *** 5.85 0.147 *** 9.43 0.098 *** 6.90 0.164 *** 11.16
DISTRESS -0.217 *** -10.42 -0.168 *** -4.29 -0.184 *** -5.94 -0.247 *** -9.99
BUYREIT 0.177 ** 2.49 0.274 *** 4.87 0.127 *** 2.67 0.199 *** 2.63
EXCHANGE&BUYEROUT -0.007 -0.33 -0.067 * -1.72 -0.035 -0.81 0.005 0.16
DISTRESS&BUYEROUT -0.086 -1.27 -0.088 -0.81 0.134 1.48 0.031 0.34
BUYREIT&BUYEROUT -0.076 -0.80 -0.074 -0.77 0.026 0.39 -0.026 -0.28
EXCHANGE&DISTRESS -0.110 -1.54 -0.252 ** -1.96 -0.040 -0.39 -0.250 ** -2.26
EXCHANGE&BUYREIT 0.028 0.12 -0.546 *** -5.67 0.301 ** 2.31
DISTRESS&BUYREIT 0.232 ** 2.09
LONGITUDE 0.109 ** 1.96 -0.041 ** -3.39 0.157 ** 2.00 0.035 1.39
LATITUDE 0.388 *** 5.16 -0.215 *** -2.86 0.244 *** 2.69 0.081 1.28
YR1998 -0.008 -0.21 -0.067 -0.98 0.044 0.81 0.065 1.10
YR1999 0.054 1.37 -0.020 -0.29 0.097 * 1.79 0.106 * 1.80
YR2000 0.089 ** 2.27 0.010 0.15 0.153 *** 2.83 0.127 ** 2.15
YR2001 0.120 *** 3.06 -0.014 -0.2 0.163 *** 3.02 0.149 *** 2.52
YR2002 0.183 *** 4.65 -0.020 -0.29 0.169 ** 3.15 0.201 *** 3.41
YR2003 0.271 *** 6.89 0.001 0.01 0.205 *** 3.80 0.239 *** 4.07
YR2004 0.374 *** 9.45 0.128 * 1.9 0.295 *** 5.49 0.330 *** 5.62
YR2005 0.482 *** 12.22 0.216 *** 3.17 0.435 *** 8.04 0.481 *** 8.20
YR2006 0.498 *** 12.46 0.230 *** 3.37 0.480 *** 8.84 0.508 *** 8.64
YR2007 0.493 *** 12.18 0.194 *** 2.82 0.518 *** 9.48 0.532 *** 8.99
YR2008 0.423 *** 10.13 0.179 *** 2.54 0.484 *** 8.67 0.501 *** 8.40
YR2009 0.277 *** 6.37 -0.035 -0.48 0.289 *** 5.00 0.316 *** 5.16
YR2010 0.216 *** 4.88 0.031 0.4 0.266 *** 4.61 0.269 *** 4.27
UNITS 0.001 *** 5.63
Submarket Clusters Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-square
YES YES YES YES
0.87 0.86 0.75 0.73
Apartment Office Industrial Retail
32711 15911 19430 27736
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of the sale price. LNASSESSED is the natural log of the 
property’s assessed value; AGE is age of the property in years; AGE2 is age squared; SQFT is total 
square footage of improvements in thousand square feet; SQFT2 is SQFT squared; LANDSQFT 
is land square footage in thousand square feet; LANDSQFT2 is LANDSQFT squared; FLOORS is 
number of floors in the building; COND_E, COND_A, COND_F denote excellent, average and 
fair condition of the structure, respectively. COND_G, indicating a good structure condition 
is the omitted building condition variable. DUALBROKER is an indicator variable, equal to one 
if the seller and the buyer broker were the same firm, and zero otherwise; RENOVATED is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the property has been renovated within the last 4 years prior 
to sale. EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction represents the purchase 
of a replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange; DISTRESS is 
binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is 
a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a 
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binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified as a REIT; EXCHANGE*DISTRESS 
is an interaction variable between EXCHANGE and DISTRESS; EXCHANGE*BUYREIT is an 
interaction variable between EXCHANGE and BUYREIT; DISTRESS*BUYOUT is an interaction 
variable between DISTRESS and BUYOUT, DISTRESS*REIT is an interaction variable between 
DISTRESS and BUYREIT; BUYREIT*BUYOUT is an interaction variable between BUYREIT and 
BUYOUT; LONGITUDE is the longitude coordinate of the property; LATITUDE is the latitude 
coordinate of the property; YRn are indicator variables for each year; UNITS is the number of 
apartment units; CONST is the constant.
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Table 7. Hedonic Regression Model where the Dependent Variable is the Natural Log of 
Apartment Sales Price, Based on Transactions with Sale Prices Less than the Mean Sale Price for 
Each Property Sub-sample.
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
CONST -6.243 -1.04 12.563 *** 9.23 19.004 ** 2.44 18.438 *** 3.81
LNASSESSED 0.270 *** 32.38 0.328 *** 24.15 0.230 *** 21.03 0.229 *** 29.79
AGE -0.002 *** -7.32 -0.004 *** -9.81 -0.003 *** -5.09 -0.004 *** -14.35
AGE2 0.000 *** 3.96 0.000 *** 7.37 0.000 * 1.76 0.000 *** 9.01
SQFT 0.015 *** 7.80 0.024 *** 14.77 0.008 *** 9.27 0.015 *** 12.38
SQFT2 0.000 *** -3.53 0.000 *** -5.17 0.000 *** -2.98 0.000 *** -4.57
LANDSQFT 0.000 1.49 0.000 -1.32 0.000 *** 2.77 0.000 *** 3.95
LANDSQFT2 0.000 -1.62 0.000 1.35 0.000 *** -2.65 0.000 *** -3.61
FLOORS 0.007 0.55 -0.028 *** -6.82 -0.017 ** -2.02 -0.017 *** -2.73
COND_E 0.135 *** 2.97 0.079 ** 2.23 0.137 *** 5.87 0.188 *** 8.94
COND_G 0.087 *** 11.64 0.056 *** 5.62 0.006 0.55 0.084 *** 10.21
COND_F -0.057 *** -3.20 0.008 0.18 0.001 0.02 -0.059 *** -3.80
DUALBROKER 0.034 *** 7.55 0.032 *** 3.47 0.013 * 1.70 0.040 *** 5.22
RENOVATED 0.060 0.84 0.066 0.92 0.116 * 1.86 0.080 1.17
BUYOUT 0.003 0.27 0.158 *** 11.38 0.074 *** 6.55 0.086 *** 9.74
EXCHANGE 0.042 *** 7.30 0.114 *** 8.37 0.051 *** 3.73 0.088 *** 7.27
DISTRESS -0.230 *** -11.90 -0.195 *** -5.72 -0.158 *** -6.49 -0.157 *** -7.89
BUYREIT -0.067 -1.29 0.257 *** 3.48 0.057 1.17 -0.024 -0.43
LONGITUDE 0.052 1.02 -0.026 ** -2.47 0.171 ** 2.47 0.107 ** 2.30
LATITUDE 0.598 *** 8.70 -0.160 *** -2.59 0.243 *** 2.91 0.074 1.25
YR1998 0.067 1.53 0.051 0.70 0.007 0.13 0.075 1.61
YR1999 0.132 *** 3.02 0.110 1.54 0.031 0.54 0.105 ** 2.25
YR2000 0.190 *** 4.41 0.149 ** 2.09 0.083 1.46 0.137 *** 2.93
YR2001 0.241 *** 5.65 0.147 ** 2.06 0.096 * 1.70 0.157 *** 3.36
YR2002 0.320 *** 7.56 0.174 ** 2.45 0.110 ** 1.96 0.181 *** 3.90
YR2003 0.422 *** 10.05 0.220 *** 3.10 0.137 ** 2.44 0.224 *** 4.83
YR2004 0.540 *** 12.87 0.332 *** 4.70 0.204 *** 3.66 0.300 *** 6.49
YR2005 0.650 *** 15.48 0.448 *** 6.31 0.319 *** 5.70 0.414 *** 8.94
YR2006 0.657 *** 15.62 0.459 *** 6.46 0.345 *** 6.15 0.434 *** 9.34
YR2007 0.637 *** 15.07 0.428 *** 5.96 0.326 *** 5.77 0.434 *** 9.27
YR2008 0.603 *** 14.14 0.454 *** 6.29 0.318 *** 5.55 0.411 *** 8.72
YR2009 0.494 *** 11.29 0.270 *** 3.63 0.202 *** 3.46 0.303 *** 6.25
YR2010 0.441 *** 9.81 0.310 *** 4.03 0.217 *** 3.68 0.269 *** 5.41
UNITS 0.007 *** 9.42









*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of the sale price. LNASSESSED is the natural log of the 
property’s assessed value; AGE is age of the property in years; AGE2 is age squared; SQFT 
is total square footage of improvements in thousand square feet; SQFT2 is SQFT squared; 
LANDSQFT is land square footage in thousand square feet; LANDSQFT2 is LANDSQFT 
squared; FLOORS is number of floors in the building; COND_E, COND_A, COND_F denote 
excellent, average and fair condition of the structure, respectively. COND_G, indicating a good 
structure condition is the omitted building condition variable. DUALBROKER is an indicator 
variable, equal to one if the seller and the buyer broker were the same firm, and zero otherwise; 
RENOVATED is a dummy variable equal to one if the property has been renovated within 
the last 4 years prior to sale. EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction 
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represents the purchase of a replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-
deferred exchange; DISTRESS is binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by 
CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-
of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified 
as a REIT. LONGITUDE is the longitude coordinate of the property; LATITUDE is the latitude 
coordinate of the property. YRn are indicator variables for each year; UNITS is the number of 
apartment units; CONST is the constant.
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Table 8. Hedonic Regression Model where the Dependent Variable is the Natural Log of 
Apartment Sales Price, Based on Transactions with Sale Prices Equal to or Exceeding the Mean 
Sale Price for Each Property Sub-sample.
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
CONST 14.986 1.17 43.299 1.24 38.102 ** 2.37 10.705 *** 20.54
LNASSESSED 0.259 *** 15.81 0.254 *** 7.88 0.171 *** 8.35 0.273 *** 18.27
AGE -0.012 *** -9.38 -0.013 *** -11.18 -0.009 *** -9.43 -0.007 *** -9.96
AGE2 0.000 *** 6.47 0.000 *** 9.60 0.000 *** 5.31 0.000 *** 6.99
SQFT 0.003 *** 14.21 0.003 *** 11.89 0.004 *** 17.49 0.006 *** 12.84
SQFT2 0.000 *** -6.76 0.000 *** -5.26 0.000 *** -8.94 0.000 *** -5.73
LANDSQFT 0.000 0.21 0.000 *** 3.13 0.000 *** 4.33 0.000 *** 5.11
LANDSQFT2 0.000 -0.25 0.000 *** -4.16 0.000 *** -5.87 0.000 *** -5.01
FLOORS 0.020 *** 5.50 0.005 * 1.78 0.013 1.27 0.023 ** 2.13
COND_E 0.229 *** 8.70 0.164 *** 7.40 0.060 ** 2.20 0.257 *** 9.48
COND_G 0.066 *** 5.75 0.034 ** 2.06 0.035 ** 2.49 0.087 *** 6.06
COND_F 0.004 0.05 0.114 1.24 -0.008 -0.15 0.027 0.48
DUALBROKER 0.025 *** 2.77 0.014 0.78 0.000 -0.02 0.041 *** 2.86
RENOVATED -0.048 -0.42 0.113 1.13 0.093 * 1.76 0.088 1.41
BUYOUT 0.068 *** 5.94 0.115 *** 7.07 0.149 *** 10.62 0.139 *** 9.81
EXCHANGE -0.029 ** -2.03 0.016 0.61 0.048 *** 2.62 0.070 *** 3.76
DISTRESS -0.221 *** -5.00 -0.156 -1.48 -0.065 -1.55 -0.262 *** -4.15
BUYREIT 0.182 ** 4.67 0.092 *** 2.56 0.125 *** 4.04 0.237 *** 5.45
LONGITUDE 0.081 0.73 0.349 1.00 0.216 1.57 -0.051 -1.00
LATITUDE 0.131 0.84 0.054 0.11 -0.106 -0.61 -0.129 -1.01
YR1998 0.001 0.01 -0.114 -1.27 0.162 ** 2.22 -0.066 -0.41
YR1999 0.095 ** 2.04 -0.117 -1.30 0.200 *** 2.86 -0.019 -0.11
YR2000 0.103 ** 2.26 -0.050 -0.55 0.228 *** 3.24 -0.031 -0.19
YR2001 0.125 *** 2.73 0.004 0.05 0.251 *** 3.56 -0.047 -0.29
YR2002 0.207 *** 4.56 -0.100 -1.09 0.231 *** 3.34 0.045 0.28
YR2003 0.230 *** 5.04 -0.044 -0.49 0.275 *** 3.99 0.074 0.45
YR2004 0.261 *** 5.72 0.095 1.06 0.343 *** 5.04 0.106 0.65
YR2005 0.341 *** 7.52 0.135 1.49 0.437 *** 6.40 0.211 1.30
YR2006 0.429 *** 9.23 0.187 ** 2.08 0.473 *** 6.89 0.272 * 1.67
YR2007 0.491 *** 10.37 0.263 *** 2.93 0.576 *** 8.36 0.291 * 1.79
YR2008 0.384 *** 7.69 0.272 *** 2.89 0.541 *** 7.67 0.292 * 1.79
YR2009 0.260 *** 4.68 0.002 0.02 0.396 *** 5.40 0.141 0.85
YR2010 0.243 *** 4.17 -0.044 -0.36 0.318 *** 4.26 0.081 0.48
UNITS 0.001 *** 9.10
Submarket Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-square
YES YES YES YES
0.87 0.85 0.66 0.68
Retail
5424 2702 5114 6053
Apartment Office Industrial
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of the sale price. LNASSESSED is the natural log of the 
property’s assessed value; AGE is age of the property in years; AGE2 is age squared; SQFT 
is total square footage of improvements in thousand square feet; SQFT2 is SQFT squared; 
LANDSQFT is land square footage in thousand square feet; LANDSQFT2 is LANDSQFT 
squared; FLOORS is number of floors in the building; COND_E, COND_A, COND_F denote 
excellent, average and fair condition of the structure, respectively. COND_G, indicating a good 
structure condition is the omitted building condition variable. DUALBROKER is an indicator 
variable, equal to one if the seller and the buyer broker were the same firm, and zero otherwise; 
RENOVATED is a dummy variable equal to one if the property has been renovated within 
the last 4 years prior to sale. EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction 
represents the purchase of a replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-
deferred exchange; DISTRESS is binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by 
CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-
of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified 
as a REIT. LONGITUDE is the longitude coordinate of the property; LATITUDE is the latitude 
coordinate of the property. YRn are indicator variables for each year; UNITS is the number of 
apartment units; CONST is the constant.
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Table 9. Hedonic Regression Model where the Dependent Variable is the Natural Log of 
Apartment Sales Price, Based on Transactions with Sale Prices Less than the Mean Sale Price for 
Each Property Sub-sample, Including Interaction of Search Cost Proxies.
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
CONST -6.402 -1.07 12.583 *** 9.28 19.017 ** 2.44 18.432 *** 3.81
LNASSESSED 0.270 *** 32.41 0.328 *** 24.12 0.230 *** 21.02 0.229 *** 29.77
AGE -0.002 *** -7.38 -0.004 *** -9.82 -0.003 *** -5.09 -0.004 *** -14.35
AGE2 0.000 *** 3.99 0.000 *** 7.38 0.000 * 1.76 0.000 *** 9.01
SQFT 0.015 *** 7.79 0.024 *** 14.76 0.008 *** 9.26 0.015 *** 12.38
SQFT2 0.000 *** -3.53 0.000 *** -5.17 0.000 *** -2.98 0.000 *** -4.57
LANDSQFT 0.000 1.49 0.000 -1.31 0.000 *** 2.77 0.000 *** 3.95
LANDSQFT2 0.000 -1.62 0.000 1.34 0.000 *** -2.64 0.000 *** -3.61
FLOORS 0.007 0.54 -0.028 *** -6.83 -0.017 ** -2.05 -0.017 *** -2.72
COND_E 0.135 *** 2.97 0.078 ** 2.22 0.137 *** 5.89 0.188 *** 8.93
COND_G 0.087 *** 11.66 0.056 *** 5.60 0.005 0.50 0.084 *** 10.20
COND_F -0.058 *** -3.22 0.008 0.19 0.000 0.02 -0.059 *** -3.80
DUALBROKER 0.033 *** 7.52 0.032 *** 3.43 0.013 * 1.73 0.040 *** 5.21
RENOVATED 0.060 0.83 0.066 0.91 0.116 * 1.86 0.079 1.17
BUYOUT 0.009 0.93 0.162 *** 11.06 0.073 *** 6.23 0.086 *** 9.46
EXCHANGE 0.044 *** 7.37 0.124 *** 8.62 0.054 *** 3.72 0.088 *** 6.74
DISTRESS -0.211 *** -11.21 -0.187 *** -5.09 -0.156 *** -6.20 -0.156 *** -7.36
BUYREIT -0.077 -1.38 0.238 *** 2.66 -0.025 -0.41 0.022 0.30
EXCHANGE&BUYEROUT -0.033 * -1.70 -0.060 -1.47 -0.018 -0.37 0.002 0.07
DISTRESS&BUYEROUT -0.278 * -1.94 0.026 0.23 0.004 0.04 -0.011 -0.18
BUYREIT&BUYEROUT 0.041 0.27 0.206 ** 2.26 -0.073 -0.70
EXCHANGE&DISTRESS -0.035 -0.62 -0.187 -1.37 -0.082 -0.75 -0.036 -0.19
EXCHANGE&BUYREIT 0.121 * 1.94
DISTRESS&BUYREIT
LONGITUDE 0.051 1.00 -0.026 ** -2.48 0.171 ** 2.46 0.107 ** 2.30
LATITUDE 0.598 *** 8.72 -0.161 *** -2.62 0.242 *** 2.90 0.074 1.25
YR1998 0.069 1.58 0.053 0.74 0.011 0.19 0.075 1.61
YR1999 0.133 *** 3.07 0.113 1.58 0.035 0.63 0.105 ** 2.25
YR2000 0.192 *** 4.47 0.152 ** 2.14 0.087 1.58 0.137 *** 2.94
YR2001 0.244 *** 5.72 0.149 ** 2.10 0.099 * 1.82 0.157 *** 3.37
YR2002 0.323 *** 7.64 0.177 ** 2.50 0.114 ** 2.08 0.181 *** 3.90
YR2003 0.425 *** 10.13 0.222 *** 3.16 0.140 *** 2.58 0.224 *** 4.83
YR2004 0.543 *** 12.96 0.335 *** 4.76 0.208 *** 3.83 0.300 *** 6.49
YR2005 0.652 *** 15.58 0.451 *** 6.38 0.323 *** 5.93 0.415 *** 8.94
YR2006 0.660 *** 15.73 0.462 *** 6.53 0.349 *** 6.40 0.434 *** 9.35
YR2007 0.640 *** 15.16 0.430 *** 6.02 0.330 *** 6.01 0.434 *** 9.28
YR2008 0.606 *** 14.23 0.456 *** 6.36 0.322 *** 5.77 0.411 *** 8.72
YR2009 0.497 *** 11.38 0.273 *** 3.69 0.206 *** 3.61 0.303 *** 6.25
YR2010 0.445 *** 9.91 0.313 *** 4.09 0.221 *** 3.84 0.269 *** 5.41
UNITS 0.007 *** 9.65
Submarket  Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-square 0.66 0.71 0.45 0.40
Retail
23945
YES YES YES YES
Apartment Office Industrial
27287 13209 14316
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of the sale price. LNASSESSED is the natural log of the 
property’s assessed value; AGE is age of the property in years; AGE2 is age squared; SQFT is total 
square footage of improvements in thousand square feet; SQFT2 is SQFT squared; LANDSQFT 
is land square footage in thousand square feet; LANDSQFT2 is LANDSQFT squared; FLOORS is 
number of floors in the building; COND_E, COND_A, COND_F denote excellent, average and 
fair condition of the structure, respectively. COND_G, indicating a good structure condition 
is the omitted building condition variable. DUALBROKER is an indicator variable, equal to one 
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if the seller and the buyer broker were the same firm, and zero otherwise; RENOVATED is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the property has been renovated within the last 4 years prior 
to sale. EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction represents the purchase 
of a replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange; DISTRESS is 
binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is 
a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a 
binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified as a REIT; EXCHANGE*DISTRESS 
is an interaction variable between EXCHANGE and DISTRESS; EXCHANGE*BUYREIT is an 
interaction variable between EXCHANGE and BUYREIT; DISTRESS*BUYOUT is an interaction 
variable between DISTRESS and BUYOUT, DISTRESS*REIT is an interaction variable between 
DISTRESS and BUYREIT; BUYREIT*BUYOUT is an interaction variable between BUYREIT and 
BUYOUT; LONGITUDE is the longitude coordinate of the property; LATITUDE is the latitude 
coordinate of the property; YRn are indicator variables for each year; UNITS is the number of 
apartment units; CONST is the constant.
38 M. Petrova, D. C. Ling
Table 10. Hedonic Regression Model where the Dependent Variable is the Natural Log of 
Apartment Sales Price, Based on Transactions with Sale Prices Equal to or Exceeding the Mean 
Sale Price for Each Property Sub-sample, Including Interaction of Search Cost Proxies.
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
CONST 15.041 1.17 44.888 1.29 38.252 ** 2.38 10.713 *** 20.55
LNASSESSED 0.259 *** 15.81 0.254 *** 7.84 0.171 *** 8.35 0.273 *** 18.37
AGE -0.012 *** -9.38 -0.013 *** -11.19 -0.009 *** -9.43 -0.007 *** -9.95
AGE2 0.000 *** 6.46 0.000 *** 9.59 0.000 *** 5.31 0.000 *** 6.98
SQFT 0.003 *** 14.21 0.003 *** 11.88 0.004 *** 17.48 0.006 *** 12.81
SQFT2 0.000 *** -6.76 0.000 *** -5.26 0.000 *** -8.93 0.000 *** -5.71
LANDSQFT 0.000 0.20 0.000 *** 3.12 0.000 *** 4.32 0.000 *** 5.11
LANDSQFT2 0.000 -0.25 0.000 *** -4.16 0.000 *** -5.86 0.000 *** -5.01
FLOORS 0.020 *** 5.50 0.005 * 1.79 0.013 1.27 0.023 ** 2.14
COND_E 0.228 *** 8.64 0.163 *** 7.33 0.060 ** 2.20 0.257 *** 9.47
COND_G 0.066 *** 5.74 0.034 ** 2.02 0.035 ** 2.48 0.087 *** 6.06
COND_F 0.004 0.06 0.114 1.24 -0.009 -0.16 0.028 0.49
DUALBROKER 0.025 *** 2.80 0.014 0.79 0.000 -0.03 0.040 *** 2.84
RENOVATED -0.048 -0.42 0.114 1.13 0.094 * 1.77 0.088 1.41
BUYOUT 0.068 *** 5.74 0.117 *** 6.91 0.149 *** 9.98 0.141 *** 9.46
EXCHANGE -0.035 ** -2.08 0.030 0.96 0.053 *** 2.64 0.083 *** 3.85
DISTRESS -0.195 *** -3.58 -0.060 -0.40 -0.086 * -1.72 -0.283 *** -3.62
BUYREIT 0.221 ** 3.20 0.117 *** 2.17 0.123 *** 2.83 0.176 1.62
EXCHANGE&BUYEROUT 0.024 0.75 -0.026 -0.51 -0.020 -0.39 -0.042 -1.00
DISTRESS&BUYEROUT -0.054 -0.62 -0.152 -0.77 0.067 0.68 0.067 0.50
BUYREIT&BUYEROUT -0.063 -0.76 -0.033 -0.47 0.004 0.06 0.070 0.59
EXCHANGE&DISTRESS -0.171 -1.01 -0.740 *** -4.06 -0.029 -0.31 -0.284 * -1.80
EXCHANGE&BUYREIT 0.402 1.34 -0.074 -1.00 0.324 ** 2.03
DISTRESS&BUYREIT -0.127 -0.97
LONGITUDE 0.080 0.72 0.359 1.03 0.217 1.57 -0.051 -1.00
LATITUDE 0.128 0.82 0.038 0.08 -0.108 -0.62 -0.130 -1.02
YR1998 -0.006 -0.12 -0.113 -1.24 0.160 ** 2.18 -0.074 -0.46
YR1999 0.089 * 1.86 -0.114 -1.25 0.198 *** 2.81 -0.028 -0.17
YR2000 0.098 ** 2.09 -0.047 -0.52 0.225 *** 3.19 -0.040 -0.24
YR2001 0.121 *** 2.57 0.011 0.12 0.248 *** 3.51 -0.054 -0.33
YR2002 0.202 *** 4.34 -0.098 -1.06 0.228 *** 3.29 0.036 0.22
YR2003 0.224 *** 4.82 -0.041 -0.45 0.272 *** 3.93 0.065 0.40
YR2004 0.254 *** 5.46 0.098 1.08 0.340 *** 4.96 0.097 0.60
YR2005 0.335 *** 7.24 0.138 1.50 0.434 *** 6.33 0.202 1.24
YR2006 0.424 *** 8.93 0.189 ** 2.07 0.470 *** 6.82 0.263 1.62
YR2007 0.485 *** 10.06 0.267 *** 2.93 0.573 *** 8.29 0.282 * 1.74
YR2008 0.379 *** 7.45 0.277 *** 2.90 0.539 *** 7.60 0.284 * 1.74
YR2009 0.255 *** 4.52 0.006 0.06 0.393 *** 5.34 0.131 0.79
YR2010 0.238 *** 4.04 -0.048 -0.38 0.316 *** 4.22 0.073 0.44
UNITS 0.001 *** 9.10
Submarket Clusters Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-square 0.87 0.85 0.66 0.71
Retail
6053
YES YES YES YES
Apartment Office Industrial
5424 2702 5114
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of the sale price. LNASSESSED is the natural log of the 
property’s assessed value; AGE is age of the property in years; AGE2 is age squared; SQFT is total 
square footage of improvements in thousand square feet; SQFT2 is SQFT squared; LANDSQFT 
is land square footage in thousand square feet; LANDSQFT2 is LANDSQFT squared; FLOORS is 
number of floors in the building; COND_E, COND_A, COND_F denote excellent, average and 
fair condition of the structure, respectively. COND_G, indicating a good structure condition 
is the omitted building condition variable. DUALBROKER is an indicator variable, equal to one 
if the seller and the buyer broker were the same firm, and zero otherwise; RENOVATED is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the property has been renovated within the last 4 years prior 
to sale. EXCHANGE is a binary variable set equal to one if transaction represents the purchase 
of a replacement property by a buyer completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange; DISTRESS is 
binary variable set equal to one if the seller was classified by CoStar as distressed; BUYOUT is 
a binary variable indicating the property acquirer is an out-of-state resident; and BUYREIT is a 
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binary variables set equal to one if the acquirer is identified as a REIT; EXCHANGE*DISTRESS 
is an interaction variable between EXCHANGE and DISTRESS; EXCHANGE*BUYREIT is an 
interaction variable between EXCHANGE and BUYREIT; DISTRESS*BUYOUT is an interaction 
variable between DISTRESS and BUYOUT, DISTRESS*REIT is an interaction variable between 
DISTRESS and BUYREIT; BUYREIT*BUYOUT is an interaction variable between BUYREIT and 
BUYOUT; LONGITUDE is the longitude coordinate of the property; LATITUDE is the latitude 
coordinate of the property; YRn are indicator variables for each year; UNITS is the number of 
apartment units; CONST is the constant.
40 M. Petrova, D. C. Ling
Table 11. Percentage Effects of Heterogeneous Search Costs Estimated Based on Equation (3) by 
Property Type where the Dependant Variable is the Natural Log of the Property Sales Price.
Panel A: Full Sample 
 Obs BUYOUT EXCHANGE DISTRESS BUYREIT
Apartments 32,711 3.8% 4.0% -20.6% 14.2%
Office 15,911 26.5% 14.2% -17.5% 25.1%
Industrial 15,911 18.6% 9.7% -15.1% 14.9%
Retail 27,736 18.5% 17.9% -21.7% 20.1%
Average 16.9% 11.4% -18.7% 18.6%
Panel A: Transactions with Sale Prices Less than the Mean Sale Price for Each Property Sub-
sample
 Obs BUYOUT EXCHANGE DISTRESS BUYREIT
Apartments 27,287 7.0% -2.8% -19.9% 19.9%
Office 13,209 12.2% NS NS 9.7%
Industrial 14,316 16.1% 4.9% -6.3% 13.3%
Retail 21,683 15.0% 7.3% -23.0% 26.8%
Average 12.6% 3.1% -16.4% 17.4%
Panel B: Transactions with Sale Prices Equal to or Exceeding the Mean Sale Price for Each 
Property Sub-sample
 Obs BUYOUT EXCHANGE DISTRESS BUYREIT
Apartments 5,424 -3.2% 5.4% -10.7% NS
Office 2,702 NS 9.8% NS 8.9%
Industrial 5,114 NS 9.8% NS 8.9%
Retail 6,053 NS 8.2% -18.8% 18.3%
Average -3.2% 7.8% -14.7% 13.6%
The observation breakdown by property type is apartment, 35,252; office and industrial, 33,937; 
and retail, 27,552. EXCHANGE represents the percentage price effect associated with the 
purchase being a replacement property of a buyer, completing a delayed tax-deferred exchange; 
DISTRESS represents the percentage price effect associated with the transaction being part of 
a distressed sale; BUYOUT represents the percentage price effect associated the purchase by 
an out-of-state resident; and BUYREIT represents the percentage price effect associated with a 
purchase by a REIT. 
Percentage price effects are based on the coefficients estimated using equation (6) by property 
type and transforming the coefficients into percent using the following formula: Percentage Price 
Effect = 100*g = 100*{exp(x) – 1}, where g is the estimated effect on sale price of a condition and 
x is the type of atypical motivation.
